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paper commenting on his (2011) interpretation of Wang Chong  王充 as an alethic
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“ Philosophical  problems arise  when language goes on holiday” wrote  Wittgenstein  (1953:
§38). In philosophical debates about  truth it is certainly the case that if we pay insufficient
attention to what exactly we are discussing we create more philosophical problems than we
solve. Hoping to avoid that – or to not exacerbate existing confusions at least – there are a few
terminological clarifications I want to make before (re-)turning to McLeod’s interpretation of
Wang Chong.
Concepts,  terms,  properties,  definitions,  and  theories  of  truth  need  to  be  carefully
distinguished, even if they are all closely related. The/a  concept of  TRUTH is a psychological
entity. It is our understanding of the notion that we refer to with the term “truth” (or related
expressions). Having the concept of TRUTH is being able to understand the difference between
what  is  the case  and what  isn’t  and consequently,  one cannot  have the  concept  of  truth
without having a number of adjacent concepts such as OBJECTIVITY,  JUSTIFICATION,  FALSEHOOD, and
MISTAKE. As I argued elsewhere (see Brons 2016), virtually every human being over the age of 2
has the/a concept of truth.
Having the/a concept of  TRUTH does not require having a word or term to express that
concept, however. Truth terms are the linguistic expressions – words or phrases – that are used
in some language (and some context) to express  TRUTH. In English, this includes expressions
such as “is a fact that” and “is the case that”. In Classical Chinese 然 ran often functions as a
truth term, but – as in English – there are other options as well. Sometimes it is useful to
distinguish truth terms from truth predicates. A truth predicate is a truth term as grammatical
and/or logical predicate.
A truth property is a property a truthbearer (proposition, statement, belief, etc.) must have
to be true – that is, a property that makes it true, or by virtue of which it is true. Philosophers
disagree  about  the  number  and  nature  of  such  truth  properties.  According  to
correspondentists, something like “correspondence with a fact” is the property that makes a
truthbearer true, for example, and pluralists claim that there are multiple truth properties,
while deflationists and primitivists maintain that there are none. Confusingly, the term “truth
property” can also refer to the thin property of being true itself. If one assumes that there are
(non-thin) truthmaking properties, then a truthbearer has the thin property of being true (i.e.
is true) if and only if it has the truthmaking property or properties.
A theory of truth is a theory about the number and nature of truth properties, but often also
includes or entails a definition of truth. The latter notion
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is  ambiguous,  however,  and  that  ambiguity  is  a  further  source  of  confusion.  Usually,  a
definition of truth is assumed to be a substantive definition – that is, a specification of what all
truths necessarily share and all falsehoods lack, and thus of the truth (-making) property or
properties. Hence, a substantive definition of truth is a theory of truth. There are other kinds
of definitions, however. A lexical definition of truth describes how truth terms are used by the
speakers of some language,  and thus captures what is sometimes called a “pre-theoretical
understanding” of truth. Bo Mou’s (ATNT) is an example of a lexical definition of truth.1 And a
functional definition of truth specifies the semantic function of a truth term or predicate.2
Tarski’s  T-schema –  “p”  is  true  if  and only if  p,  or  something relevantly  similar  –  is  the
paradigmatic  example  of  a  functional  definition  of  truth.  It  captures  the  disquotational
character  of  the  thin  truth  property,  and  is  accepted  by  virtually  all  participants  in
philosophical debates about truth. It implies that truth terms are disquotational, and that a
term that is not disquotational is not a truth term (Brons 2016).
As mentioned above, having the concept of  TRUTH implies having a number of  adjacent
concepts including JUSTIFICATION, but this does not imply that those adjacent concepts are really
the same concept, as any serious attempt to come up with lexical definitions will immediately
reveal. Nevertheless, TRUTH and JUSTIFICATION are easy to confuse and this is a further source of
confusion, and it cannot be emphasized enough that a theory of justification is not a theory of
truth. A theory about when one is justified to believe that something is true is not a theory of
truth, but a theory of justification – and thus, epistemology. Similarly, a theory about the
reliability of reports – that is, when to take those for truth – is an epistemological theory and
not a theory of truth. There is a lot of epistemology in classical Chinese thought, but I haven’t
seen a theory of truth yet, and I doubt there is one.3
A  further  (albeit  not  wholly  unrelated)  complication  is  that  theories  of  truth  are  not
necessarily explicitly endorsed, but may also be implicitly assumed. Much (recent) Western
philosophy is implicitly correspondentist, for
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1 (ATNT)  states  that  “The  nature  of  truth  (or  the  truth  bearer)  consists  in  (the  truth  bearer’s)
capturing the (due) way things are.” (Mou 2015: 151). On (ATNT), see also below.
2 Deflationists and primitivists sometimes claim that truth cannot be defined, but this only means
that there can be no substantive definition of truth (because there are no non-thin truth properties).
It does not imply that there are no lexical and functional definitions.
3 On the  point  made  in  this  paragraph,  and  more  on  how  to  distinguish theories  of  truth  from
theories of justification, see Brons 2016.
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example. There do not seem to be explicit theories of truth in classical Chinese philosophy,
but that does not necessarily imply that there are no implicit theories either. Some thinker
would be an implicit substantivist (i.e. a correspondentist, coherentist, pluralist, etc.) if she is
implicitly  committed  to  the  existence  of  some  truth  property  or  properties  (as  roughly
defined above) – that is, if she is committed to there being something by virtue of which some
“things” are true while others are not. However, lacking such a commitment is not the same
as  being  committed  to  the  lack  of  a  truth  (-making)  property,  and  it  is  the  latter  that
(partially) defines primitivism and deflationism, and for that reason, implicit primitivism or
implicit deflationism is unlikely (and probably even incoherent).4 
Nevertheless, if a relevant body of thought lacks any ontological commitment to truth (-
making) properties and lacks any suggestion of (the possibility of) a substantive definition of
truth, then in that body of thought  TRUTH is a  de facto primitive, and that body of thought
could, therefore, be considered “de facto primitivist”. Such  de facto primitivism is probably
rather  widespread,  but  it  should  not  be  confused  with  implicit  primitivism,5 and  neither
should it be mistaken for a theory of truth – a de facto primitivist has no (explicit or implicit)
theory of truth.
These clarifications should put us in a better position to assess Wang Chong’s views related
to truth and McLeod’s interpretation thereof, but let’s start with my own suggestion of quasi-
pluralism.  Essentially,  quasi-pluralism is  (explicit)  primitivism about  truth combined with
pluralism about justification. However, considering that there is no inherent link between
these two -isms, combining them under a single heading is unwarranted at best and probably
even misleading. Furthermore, pluralism about justification does not entail much more than
the rather pedestrian idea that the justification of normative claims is (subtly) different from
the justification of factual claims. Hence, quasi-pluralism was not a very good idea. Moreover,
it cannot possibly be attributed to Wang Chong because there is insufficient textual evidence
to attribute any theory of justification to him, and because Wang Chong was not a primitivist.
(He may have been a de facto primitivist, but that is insufficient here.) 
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In response to my first objection to his pluralist reading of Wang Chong, McLeod rejects
my characterization of alethic pluralism summarized in (TP) as  ∀p[T(p) ↔ ∃A[A(p) Φ(A)]]∧ ,
but fails to offer an alternative characterization (or at least one that would allow falsification
of its attribution). He is right, however, that there is a problem with (TP), but it isn’t the
problem he perceives. The problem is that two of the predicates in (TP) – namely T and A –
explicitly  refer  to domains,  while  pluralism does not necessarily have to involve domain-
relativity  (even  if  most  pluralisms  do).  This  mistake  is  easily  fixed  by  changing  the
descriptions of these two predicate symbols: T is a general truth predicate and A is a non-
4 An implicit primitivist/deflationist would be implicitly committed to the non-existence of truth
properties,  and  I  doubt  that  the  notion  of  an  implicit  commitment  to  the  non-existence  of
something makes sense. If such an implicit commitment is impossible indeed, then primitivism and
deflationism cannot be implicit.
5 See previous footnote.
general truth predicate (and Φ is the method or criterion of identification of A as a truth
predicate). 
All of the pluralisms mentioned by McLeod in his reply (including those in other texts he
mentions) fit (TP) understood as such, and it is unlikely that a theory of truth that doesn’t can
be meaningfully called “pluralist”. Indeed, McLeod’s theory also fits (TP) perfectly, even if he
denies that himself. McLeod thinks that his theory doesn’t fit (TP) because shi 是and ran 然
“are the same way of fitting shi 實” (2015a: 172), but that is confusing A with Φ in (TP). “The
way of fitting” is the method of identification of certain predicates as truth predicates, but
that  way  of  identification  is  not  identical  to  those  predicates  itself.  Although  McLeod’s
reading  of  Wang  Chong  is  somewhat  obscured  by  related  confusions  of  thin  properties,
truthmaking properties, predicates, and concepts of truth, it is clear enough that he claims
that shi 實 is general truth T, that shi 是and ran 然 are two different cases of A, and that the
criterion Φ for identifying the latter as truth predicates is having “the properties we do and
should seek when appraising sentences” (2015b: 162).
McLeod isn’t worried about my first objection (symmetry concerns about shi/xu 實虛), and
I now think this isn’t a serious objection indeed. If pluralism isn’t necessarily domain-relative,
then my fourth objection (about the fuzzy domain boundaries in Wang Chong) shouldn’t be a
major concern either. That leaves my second and third objections.
Unfortunately, McLeod misses the point of my second objection. That objection is that his
pluralist reading depends on a particular translation of Wang Chong. If shi 實is translated as
“objective” rather than as “true” (and alternative translations of  the other key terms are
adopted as well), then the case for pluralism evaporates. McLeod responds to this objection by
charging that I didn’t offer a definition of “objective”, but neither does he offer a definition of
“truth” (i.e. of his preferred translation). Even more peculiar is his suggestion that OBJECTIVITY
may be the same as TRUTH. More important, however, is that the point of my objection is not
that the translation as “objective” would be
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better than the translation as “true” (although it very well may be)6 – rather, the point is that
McLeod’s interpretation depends on the correctness of one particular translation, and that he
offers no argument why that translation should be chosen over alternatives.
My third objection was that there is nothing in Wang Chong’s writings that suggests that
he was committed to the existence  of  (non-thin)  truth properties  or  to  the  possibility of
substantive definitions of truth. Because pluralism is partially defined by such commitments,
Wang Chong cannot be charitably interpreted as a pluralist. Rather than directly responding
to this objection, McLeod makes two evasive moves. First he considerably lowers the bar. He is
merely offering “one  possible interpretation” of  Wang Chong and does  not  claim that  his
interpretation is  “the only possible one consistent with the text” (175).  What justifies his
interpretation is  that  is  “more interesting or  illuminating” (id.).  I’ll  respond to this  move
below.7
6 One possible reason to prefer my “alternative” translation is that neither shi 實 nor shi 是 appears
to  be  disquotational,  which  would  imply  that  they  are  not  truth  terms  at  all,  and  thus  that
translating them as such is misleading.
7 But I can’t resist remarking here that this methodological evasion maneuver reminds me a bit too
McLeod’s second evasive move is a rather dubious one. He justifies his attribution of a
substantive theory of truth to Wang Chong by suggesting that even if there is no textual
justification to attribute a substantive theory to some thinker, we are justified to make that
attribution anyway, because otherwise we would be attributing primitivism. Apparently, that
substantivism  is  more  or  less  the  default  in  Western  philosophy  is  sufficient  ground  for
McLeod  to  assume  that  –  lacking  contrary  evidence  –  classical  Chinese  thinkers  were
substantivists as well. I reject this suggestion, but I also reject the idea that the alternative to
attributing substantivism is attributing primitivism. It isn’t, for reasons mentioned above –
rather, the alternative is attributing de facto primitivism, and it may indeed be the case that
very many philosophers (especially outside the Western tradition) and the vast majority of
non-philosophers were and are de facto primitivists.
McLeod claims that his reading of Wang Chong is just one possible interpretation, and that
–  in  the  first  place  –  interpretations  should  be  interesting  or  illuminating.  So,  is  his
interpretation  a  possible interpretation  of  Wang  Chong  indeed?  And  is  it  interesting  or
illuminating? The answer to the first question depends on how liberal one wishes to be about
what  is  considered  possible.  McLeod’s  reading  is  probably  consistent  with  the  textual
evidence, but that’s
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mostly because that textual evidence is silent on much of the issue, and string theory (in
physics) is consistent with Wang Chong’s writings in the same sense. It is debatable whether
consistency  with  available  textual  evidence  in  this  thin  sense  is  sufficient  for  an
interpretation  to  be  considered  “possible”,  but  I’m  inclined  to  say  that  it  isn’t.  Textual
evidence must support the interpretation, and McLeod’s reading fails on that account. The
textual evidence does not support a substantivist reading of McLeod. In fact, there is nothing
suggesting that Wang Chong held any theory of truth at all, either explicitly or implicitly.8
To be interesting or illuminating a theory needs to be minimally plausible at least,  but
McLeod’s theory fails on this account as well. Recall that the criterion Φ that identifies some
predicate  as  a  truth  predicate  is  having  “the  properties  we  do  and  should  seek  when
appraising sentences” (2015b: 162). However, that certainly cannot be a sufficient condition,
and  it  probably  isn’t  even  a  necessary  condition.  Being  grammatically  correct,  being
understandable, being aesthetically pleasing, being arousing, and a host of other properties
are  all  “properties  we  do  and  should  seek  when  appraising  sentences”  in  at  least  some
contexts, and none of those are plausible identifiers of a truth predicate. And it isn’t too hard
to imagine cases and circumstances in which being true is a property that we should not seek.
Hence, the centerpiece of McLeod’s pluralism is seriously (and obviously) flawed.
McLeod reads a one-concept-multiple-properties pluralism into Wang Chong’s writings,
but it is unlikely that Wang Chong had any beliefs with regards to truth properties at all. It is
commonly  assumed  that  there  is  only  one  concept  of  TRUTH,  so  that  aspect  of  McLeod’s
pluralism received little attention, but what if that assumption is wrong? If shi 是 and ran 然
much of the “flowery falsehoods” (華虛) that “astound the hearers and move their minds” (驚耳動
心), which Wang Chong argued against (Duizuo 對作 §2).
8 Consequently, I also reject my own previous suggestion (in Brons 2015) that Wang Chong had an
implicit theory of truth.
are both truth terms indeed,9 they could be associated with different concepts rather than
different properties.
There is an ambiguity about truth that is made explicit in Mou’s (ATNT) by means of his
bracketing of the word “due”, and one may wonder whether there really are two concepts of
TRUTH – one with that word and one without it. If we say that it is true that Mt. Fuji is 3776m
high, then what we mean is that the world is such that Mt. Fuji has that height indeed. But if
we say that it is true that torturing children is wrong, I’m not so sure that what we mean is
that the world is such that torturing children is wrong indeed. Rather, it seems to me that
such normative truths are irreducibly normative (and I take Mou’s bracketed “due” to capture
that normativity). However, if normative truths are
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inherently normative and factual truths are not – or not in the same sense, at least – then we
have two concepts of TRUTH.
Wang Chong cannot be charitably interpreted as an alethic pluralist. His silence on (non-
thin) properties and definitions of truth implies that he was a de facto primitivist, but if he had
multiple truth terms and one of those stands for an inherently normative concept of truth,
while another does not, then he had two concepts of TRUTH indeed.
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